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Although relatively little noticed on this side of the Atlantic, the United Kingdom is in 
the midst of a constitutional crisis over proposals to reform the judiciary and to establish 
a Supreme Court for the first time in their history. Resulting primarily from long standing 
debates over how best to “modernize” ancient British institutions and practices, these 
reforms are also influenced by the immediate and serious practical pressures facing any 
government grappling with global threats to national security. Accordingly, the debate in 
the U.K. has important implications for all democratic governments seeking to uphold 
“the rule of law” and preserve liberty in the face of international terrorism. 
 
THE INTRODUCTION OF PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Prime Minister Tony Blair stunned the British legal community on June 12, 2003, by 
announcing the creation of a Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, the abolition of the 
office of Lord Chancellor, and an entirely new approach to selecting the country’s 
judiciary.1 These changes are aimed at separating the British judiciary from the executive 
and legislative functions of government, and incorporate proposals that had generally 
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1 See, Department of Constitutional Affairs, CP 11/03, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A SUPREME COURT FOR 
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2been part of the Labour Party agenda since coming into office in 1997.2 Nevertheless, the 
announcement of these constitutional reforms actually came as an unexpected part of a 
relatively routine mid-term cabinet reshuffle. In effect, Blair attempted to sweep away 
1400 years of British constitutional history and significantly alter the country’s unwritten 
constitutional conventions with a press release.3
While the British typically regard the ability to evolve and adapt to new circumstances 
over time as one of its principal strengths of their unwritten constitution, when compared 
to the more rigid structure and amendment process of a written constitution such as that 
found in the United States for example, announcing major constitutional reforms in this 
fashion was seen by many within and without the judiciary as ill-considered at best. 
Following upon various government sponsored legislative acts that incorporated the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
into British domestic law,4 devolved greater legislative and executive authority to 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales,5and removed the right of most hereditary peers to 
sit in the House of Lords,6 the government’s announcement greatly surprised the 
Conservative opposition and many others. Characterized as a “ragbag”7 of proposals and 
2 See Oral Evidence Before the House of Commons Select Committee on the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department, June 30, 2003, Question Nos. 51-52, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmlcd/903/3063001.htm [hereinafter 
EVIDENCE.]
3 See, George Jones and Joshua Rozenberg, Blair Casts Aside Legal History in Radical Reshuffle, The 
Daily Telegraph, June 13, 2003,at 1; Pegs and Holes, Institutional Reform, New Labour, and a Cabinet 
Reshuffle, The Times, June 13, 2003, at 25.
4
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3“yet another trendy constitutional upheaval worked out on the back of an envelope, 
hopelessly ill-thought through,”8 these latest reforms were severely criticized for being 
handled in a manner that was “a bit of a shambles”.9 Others also noted that “even the best 
friends of this proposal might have hoped for a better start for it”.10
Lord Irvine of Lairg’ s immediate resignation and tributes to his role as the “last Lord 
Chancellor” following the Prime Minister’s announcement,11 combined with the 
appointment in his stead of Lord Falconer of Thoroton to the newly created post of 
Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs,12 created an initial impression that these 
changes were a fait accompli. However, even with an unwritten constitution, the process 
of change is more complex than simply issuing a press statement. As subsequently 
clarified,13 that process involves a government consultation paper, soliciting public 
comments,14 and culminates with the passage of implementing legislation in Parliament. 
During this time Lord Falconer serves as Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs,
while also wearing the Lord Chancellor’s wig and robe, as he shephe rds the reforms 
through Parliament.15 Accordingly, the Constitutional Reform Bill may have started “on 
8
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4the back of an envelope,” but as introduced in the House of Lords on February 24, 2004,
it actually runs more than 200 pages.16
The abolition of the post of Lord Chancellor, a position that dates to 605 and precedes the 
establishment of Parliament by several centuries, is the keystone of the Bill and the 
government’s proposals for reform.17 Historically, the Lord High Chancellor and Keeper 
of the Great Seal of the Realm acted as the sovereign’s secretary and chief 
administrator.18  As a key figure in the Royal Council, the Lord Chancellor was also 
responsible for the courts of equity, and later presided over Parliament when the monarch 
was unavailable or absent.19 Today, as a result of the nineteenth century merger of the 
courts of law and equity, the Lord Chancellor serves as the head of the judiciary for 
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, in addition to chairing the Appellate Committee of 
the House of Lords and presiding over the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; sits 
as Speaker in the House of Lords; and is the senior government official responsible for 
the administration of the courts, and is specifically assigned various responsibilities in 
nearly 700 separate statutory references.20 Thus, the Lord Chancellor simultaneously 
16 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/030/2004030.pdf  However, Lord Woolf 
also noted that the 200 page length of the bill was “relatively modest by today’s standards”. See Lord 
Woolf, The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales,  The Rule of Law and a Change in the Constitution,
Squire Centenary Lecture, Cambridge University, 3 March 2004, available at 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/speeches/lcj030304.htm. [Hereinafter WOOLF LECTURE].
17 See id and Department for Constitutional Affairs, Lord Chancellors: AD605 - Present
http://www.dca.gov.uk/lcfr.htm.
18
 Department of Constitutional Affairs, CP 13/03, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: REFORMING THE OFFICE OF 
LORD CHANCELLOR  (18 September 2003) at 12-14, http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/lcoffice/lcoffice03.pdf
[hereinafter CONSULTATION PAPER: CHANCELLOR].
19 Id.
20 See id. at 16-18, and Annex E. The Lord Chancellor also has a number of other roles, including the 
administration of certain Royal Peculiars, ecclesial rights and patronage, and supervision of academic 
institutions and eleemosynary (i.e. charitable) corporations. See id. at 23-35. See also WOOLF LECTURE, 
supra note 16, at 8.
5serves as a judge, parliamentarian, and government minister, and it is this multiplicity of 
roles which the Constitutional Reform Bill endeavors to untangle.21
The Bill does so by abolishing this ancient office, which has been held by figures such as 
Thomas Becket, Sir Thomas More, and Cardinal Wolsey,22 and reallocating the Lord 
Chancellor’s various responsibilities. The Bill would assign the Lord Chancellor’s 
ministerial or executive functions for the court system to the Secretary of State for 
Constitutional Affairs who will neither act as a judge nor sit on any body in a judicial 
capacity.23 In a related provision, the Lord Chief Justice is given new authority as the 
President of the Courts of England and Wales for representing the interests of the 
judiciary to Parliament and the Secretary of State.24 The Secretary, and all other 
government ministers, are also subject to a new statutory obligation to respect and 
safeguard the continued independence of the judiciary.25 A further measure designed to 
bolster the independence of the judiciary from political influence is the transfer of the 
Lord Chancellor’s power to nominate and appoint judges for England and Wales to the 
Secretary, acting upon the recommendations of an independent Judicial Appointments 
21
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25 Id. at cl.1.
6Commission.26 With regard to the Lord Chancellor’s parliamentary role, the Speaker of 
the House of Lords will be made independent of the executive and the position filled in a 
manner to be determined by the Lords themselves.27 Lastly, Parliament’s judicial 
function, as exercised by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and the Judicial  
Committee of the Privy Council, is transferred to a new Supreme Court for the United 
Kingdom, thereby separating the legislature from the judiciary for the first time in 
Parliament’s history.28
Irrespective of the merit of these proposals, the manner in which the government 
announced the reforms and its intent to push the matter to a conclusion in the current 
session of Parliament continues to have serious repercussions. Opponents of the reform 
package, including many of the senior members of the judiciary, strenuously assert that 
the proposals are not well thought out, and that more time is needed to study and 
understand their implications – an argument that is perhaps bolstered by the special role 
that a complex mix of practice, convention, and tradition plays in delineating the 
legitimate scope of authority for the various branches of government when constitutional 
checks and balances are not specifically enumerated in a written constitution.29
26 See id. at Part 3, and Department of Constitutional Affairs, CP 10/03, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A NEW 
WAY OF APPOINTING JUDGES  (14 July 2003), http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/jacommission/judges.pdf.
27 See, Constitutional Reform Bill (H.L. 30), Part 1 cl.11, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/030/2004030.pdf, and Statement by the Prime 
Minister on Reshuffle, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3965.asp.
28 See, Constitutional Reform Bill (H.L. 30), Part 2, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/030/2004030.pdf.
29 See e.g., Frances Gibb and Philip Webster, Ministers Are Breaking the Law, Say Judges, The Times, 
March 4, 2004, at 1.
7In a highly unusual move, the House of Lords voted by a substantial margin to send the 
government’s Constitutional Reform Bill to a select committee, a parliamentary tactic 
used to block further consideration of proposed legislation employed only once before in 
modern times.30 In response, the government apparently considered withdrawing the bill  
from the House of Lords, reintroducing it into the House of Commons, and eventually 
seeking its passage over the Lord’s objection under the authority of the Parliament Acts,31
which prevents the House of Lords from blocking legislation in two consecutive sessions 
of Parliament.32 Although a less confrontational approach won out, the attitudes and 
comments revealed during this parliamentary maneuvering are particularly telling. 
While the judiciary and the House of Lords criticized the government for proceeding with 
major constitutional changes with insufficient preparation or thought, they were in turn 
accused of attacking the government’s Bill, at least in part, because they oppose the 
Labour government’s plans to abolish the remaining hereditary peers, resulting in an 
upper house that is entirely appointed.33 Peter Hain, the Labour party Leader of the House 
of Commons, declared that by referring the Bill to a select committee what the "peers are 
proposing is completely undemocratic…We cannot allow it to happen. Peers are being 
incited by Michael Howard [the leader of the Conservative Party] to overturn the will of 
the elected chamber….That is absolutely undemocratic and we cannot allow it to 
happen."34 Lord Falconer also said that he feared that referring the Bill to a select 
30
 Greg Hurst and Gabriel Rozenberg, Supreme Court Bill “Wrecked” by Lords Vote,  The Times, March 9, 
2004 at 10.
31 Parliament Act, 1949, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103 (Eng.); Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13 (Eng).
32
 Philip Webster, Labour Vows to Defeat Lords in Power Struggle, The Times, March 8, 2004, at 1.
33 See Peter Waugh, Lords Told To Agree Deal Or Face Cut In Powers, The Independent (London), March 
10, 2004, at 16.
34
 Philip Webster, Labour Vows to Defeat Lords in Power Struggle, The Times, March 8, 2004, at 1.
8committee would mean that the “elected chamber” would not get a chance to consider it 
in the current session.35 Baroness Amos, the Labour leader in the House of Lords voiced 
a similar opinion after the vote to refer the Bill to the select committee passed, saying, 
“[b]y this vote, this House - the unelected House [of Lords] - has made it impossible for 
the democratically elected House of Commons to receive this Bill, promised in the 
Queen's Speech in November, in time to consider it this session. That is very serious 
indeed."36 Ultimately, however, the government and Lords agreed to continue with the 
current bill on the understanding that the select committee would consider the reform 
proposals expeditiously and that, if necessary, the Bill could be carried over into the next 
Parliamentary session in time to still pass before the next general election in 2005.37  “It 
is a compromise but we will get our Bill” according to at least one government minister.38
THE REASONS FOR CHANGE
Complaining that the Lords are frustrating the will of the people’s elected representatives 
shows a lack of appreciation of the role of the second chamber in providing political 
balance in a system in which the government is formed by the party that controls the
House of Commons – or at least a latent desire for a unicameral legislature. Moreover, 
given the focus of this particular Bill, it also suggests a lack of understanding of the 
judiciary’s traditional role in legally limiting the power of the majority in governmental 
35
 Greg Hurst and Gabriel Rozenberg, Supreme Court Bill “Wrecked” by Lords Vote,  The Times, March 9, 
2004 at 10.
36 Marie Woolf And Ben Russell, Government Crisis As Lords Scupper Supreme Court Bill, The 
Independent (London), March 9, 2004, at 11.
37
 Philip Webster, Ministers in Deal with Tories After Lords Sabotage, The Times, March 10, 2004, at 13.
38 Id.
9systems characterized by a greater separation of powers than historically has been the 
case in the United Kingdom.
In Britain, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty limits the courts’ authority or 
willingness to overturn legislation, but these limits on judicial review are counterbalanced 
by the presence of the Law Lords in the legislature and by the judicial functions exercised 
by Parliament in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and in the Privy
Council. It is actually the different approach British courts take towards judicial review 
that fundamentally distinguishes the legal system in the United Kingdom from that in the 
United States, rather than a reliance upon unwritten or written constitutional provisions.  
The ability of the courts in the United States to declare legislative or executive actions 
illegal is, after all, itself a creature of caselaw – and based upon Justice Marshall’s 1803 
decision in Marbury v. Madison rather than the text of the U.S. Constitution itself. 
Moreover, Marshall’s conception of judicial review is inherently undemocratic, and 
highlights the courts’ role in protecting individual interests from the will of the majority 
as part of a system characterized by a strong separation of governmental powers.
The Constitutional Reform Bill, and many of the other constitutional reforms instituted 
by Blair’s “New Labour” government in the name of modernization, arguably reflect a 
desire for greater executive authority and freedom from the checks and balances imposed 
by the structure and conventions of the British constitutional system. The irony of the 
current proposal is that by throwing away long established constitutional practices, 
conventions, and institutions, the government may well be setting the stage for a greater 
10
role for judicial review in the British system. Rather than simply providing greater
flexibility to government, establishing a Supreme Court and enhancing the separation of 
the judiciary from Parliament might result in the substitution of new more legalistic limits 
on executive and legislative authority, replacing the traditional British reliance upon
essentially political controls to ensure the responsible exercise of governmental power.
Two different  motivations appear to be causing the Blair government to pursue these 
changes: one based upon longstanding debates over constitutional principle and theory –
whether Locke’s or Montesquieu’s view of government should prevail over that of 
Austin, Bentham, and Hobbes39 – and the other prompted by the much more prosaic and 
practical needs of a government fighting an international war on terrorism in the post 
9/11 world. 
From the perspective of constitutional theory, the traditional British system of legislative 
sovereignty has its ideological roots in the authoritarian view of the social contract 
espoused by Thomas Hobbes, whereas the separation of powers doctrine at the heart of 
the U.S. legal system emphasizes equal and semi-autonomous authorities derived from 
John Locke’s  conception of natural law and restricted governmental power.40 Very 
different roles for the judiciary, and different methods for protecting individual liberty, 
resulted from these contrasting approaches to the nature of government and the source of 
sovereign power.41
39 See EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at Question No. 22.
40
 G. Marshall, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 1-2 (I971).
41 See, P.L. Fitzgerald, An English Bill of Rights? Some Observations from Her Majesty’s Former Colonies 
in America,  70 Georgetown L.J. 1229, 1282-1296 (1982).
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When describing the English legal system in his Commentaries in the 18th century, 
Blackstone hypothesized “there is and must be in all [states] a supreme, irresistible, 
absolute, uncontrolled authority”; and this authority is “the natural, inherent right that 
belongs to the sovereignty of the state . . . of making and enforcing laws”.42 “All other 
powers of the state . . . in the execution of their several functions,” have to conform to 
this inherent law-making power, “or else the Constitution is at an end.”43 Parliament – the 
aggregate body of the Crown, Lords, and Commons –  is the law making power in 
Britain. Therefore, it is in Parliament that the “absolute despotic power” called
sovereignty resides.44 As a consequence, Blackstone reasons that judicial review is 
necessarily limited: 
I know that it is generally laid down…that  acts of Parliament contrary to reason 
are void. But if the Parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is 
unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it; and the examples usually 
alledged in support of this sense of the rule do none of them prove, that where the 
main object of a statute is unreasonable the judges are at liberty to reject it; for 
that were to set the judicial power above the legislative, which would be 
subversive of all government.45
Thus, the British judiciary are confined to applying  and interpreting the laws passed by 
Parliament, rather than ruling on their constitutional legality. As Professor Dicey noted in 
the late 19th century, in English history Parliament was the traditional protector of 
individual rights, and the guarantor of the independence of the judiciary, against 
overreaching authority of the monarch. According to Dicey’s classic formulation of the 
42
 1 W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES 48 (Tucker ed. 1803).
43
 Id..
44 Id. Bailyn suggests that this doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is justified in the end by the
theory of the ultimate supremacy of the people, a “supremacy that is normally dormant and exercised
only at moments of rebellion against tyrannical government” and cites John Locke’s apology for the 
Glorious Revolution, the Second Treatise of Government. See B. Bailyn, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 160-75 (1967), at 173, 201.
45 1 W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES 9 I (1st ed. 1765). 
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doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament alone has, “the right to make or 
unmake any law whatever; and further…no person or body is recognized…as having a 
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”46
So in the United Kingdom:
the Crown remains the source of governmental authority. Sovereignty rests in the 
Crown in Parliament. The popular will is expressed through the representative 
institution of Parliament, and the popular or democratic control is exercised 
through the ballot box . . . . The Crown is controlled by Parliament, the Crown in 
general being confined to advisors who have the confidence of Parliament. The 
judiciary, appointed by the executive under Parliamentary authority, is to resolve 
contests between subjects, or between subjects and the executive, according to the 
law, unwritten or statutory. 
In…contrast…when the American colonies cut the umbilical cord and secured the 
Treaty of Paris, the people were postulated as the source of power and authority. 
The representative institutions of government, President and Congress, were 
denied sovereignty which resided with the people. These institutions operate in 
government, as it were, by delegation. As a result of American history, the 
judiciary came to occupy the position of an arbiter between government, and
the people, ensuring that rights, natural or human rights, over which power had 
not been delegated or which was held not to have been delegated, were not 
infringed by legislative or executive action. If to this situation is added the 
American Bill of Rights, the difference in judicial traditions is both apparent and 
explained.47
Accordingly, in the U.K. there is neither a separate constitutional court, as found in many 
civil law systems, nor an “American style” supreme court with the power to overturn 
legislation. Instead, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords hears criminal and 
civil appeals from the courts in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and civil (but not 
46 See  A.V. Dicey, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959) at 39-40.
47
 Sir Garfield Barwick, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, Address Before the Bentham
Club, University College, London 9-10 (July 16, 1979) as quoted in Fitzgerald, supra note 41, at 1272-
1273.
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criminal) appeals from Scotland.48 The twelve Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, also known 
as the “Law Lords,” perform the judicial function of the House of Lords pursuant to the 
Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876, as well as being full members of the House of Lords 
and life peers.49 Additionally, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the House 
of Lords handles questions concerning devolution, that is, whether the Scottish 
Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly, are 
acting within the proper scope of their respective authority, along with certain appeals 
from Commonwealth countries.50 Established pursuant to the Judicial Committee Act of 
1833, the Judicial Committee is comprised of the Law Lords, and numerous Privy 
Councillors, although it is nevertheless separate and distinct from the Appellate 
Committee with its own jurisdiction.51 The multiple roles performed by the Lord 
Chancellor – as the presiding officer on these judicial committees, speaker of the upper 
house, and member of the government’s cabinet – are a key part of this system, and 
helped to make the British constitutional structure work as the demands made upon the 
Crown and government evolved over time.52 In essence, one of the reasons that the 
British constitutional structure has been so successful in adapting to changing 
circumstances  over times is because of the absence of a formal separation of powers, 
48 CONSULTATION PAPER: COURT, supra note 1, at 10-11, House of Lords, LLN 2003/007, The Appellate 
Jurisdiction of the House of Lords (2003) at 13, 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/HLLAppellate.pdf.
49 Id.
50
 The Privy Council also has jurisdiction over certain ecclesiastical matters. See CONSULTATION PAPER: 
COURT, supra note 1, at 10-11, House of Lords, LLN 2003/007, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of 
Lords (2003) at 17-19, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/HLLAppellate.pdf.
51 Id.
52 See Robert Stevens, Don’t Let “Independence” Mythology Halt Reform, The Times, July 15, 2003, Law, 
at 8.
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combined with a powerful traditional culture of mutual respect, restraint, and cooperation 
among the various arms of government.53
Despite its demonstrated historical success, questions nevertheless arise concerning the 
actual or perceived independence of the judiciary under this structure.54 Given the 
importance now placed on a more strict separation of powers in modern times –
especially with regard to the various emerging democracies – the current constitutional 
structure in United Kingdom has been increasingly criticized. For example, even though 
the U.K. is widely recognized as one of the world’s oldest democracies, an original 
signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and a founding 
member of the Council of Europe, the compatibility of the British constitutional system 
with terms of the ECHR is not entirely clear. In September of last year, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution expressing its concern over 
Britain’s compliance with the right to a fair trial by independent and impartial tribunals as 
guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR, and specifically endorsed  the need for the 
constitutional reforms proposed by the Labour government.55 Although this concern may 
perhaps be mitigated by the Law Lords’ practice of generally refraining from party 
political debate in Parliament, or recusing themselves from judicial matters when they 
have actually participated in debate,56 the Council felt it “essential that even in the 
absence of concrete challenges, the judiciary should be seen as independent both by 
53 See, WOOLF LECTURE, supra note 16, at 2.
54 See e.g., Raymond Youngs , Cold Neutrality? A Comparison of the Standards of the House of Lords with 
those of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 20 OXFORD J.LEG. S. 391 (2000).
55
 Council of Europe, Standing Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Resolution 1342 on Office 
of the Lord Chancellor in the Constitutional System of the United Kingdom (8 September 2003), 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%2FDocuments%2FAdoptedTex
t%2FTA03%2FERES1342.htm.
56 See e.g. Remarks of Lord Bingham Hansard, 22 June 2000, column 419.
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[those in the U.K.] and by fellow European countries.”57 Indeed, the European Court of 
Human Rights held in McGonnell v United Kingdom, that there was an apparent (though 
not actual) lack of impartiality when the Bailiff of Guernsey sat in judgment on a case 
involving legislation that he participated in passing.58 The Court of Session in Scotland 
similarly held in Starrs v Procurator Fiscal, Linlithgow that the executive’s systematic 
reliance on temporary judges who could be discharged at any time without challenge or 
explanation was inconsistent with an independent judiciary and the right to an impartial 
trial under the ECHR.59
The Council’s resolution and these cases reflect an evolving notion that judicial 
independence and impartiality must be measured by both subjective and objective 
standards. As the European Court of Human Rights stated in Findlay v. United Kingdom,
a “tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias [and] it must also be 
impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is it must offer sufficient guarantees to 
exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.”60 Beyond the need to objectively 
demonstrate independence and impartiality within the British judicial system, however, 
the Council of Europe’s resolution also reflected a concern among the other forty 
members with written constitutions that the situation in the U.K. “may … cause 
57
 Erik Jurgens, Report to the Council of Europe, Standing Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 
on the Office of the Lord Chancellor in the Constitutional System of the United Kingdom, Doc. 9798 (28 
April 2003), at ¶33, 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%2FDocuments%2FWorkingDoc
s%2FDoc03%2FEDOC9798.htm.
58 McGonnell v United Kingdom, (2000) 30 EHRR 289.
59 Starrs v Procurator Fiscal, Linlithgow, [2000] HRLR 191.
60 Findlay v. United Kingdom, [1997] 24 EHRR 221, at ¶73.
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confusion, or be abused, in the new member countries.” 61 As the countries comprising 
the Council, including the U.K., are “repeatedly stressing the judiciary should be a 
completely independent branch of government” there is a political desire to avoid being 
seen as directing newly emerging democracies to “do as I say and not as I do”.62
Thus, the push for reform is not really driven so much by a need to significantly alter an 
already well-regarded constitutional system, but rather to update intergovernmental 
relationships regulated by practice, convention, and informal – largely political – checks 
and balances, with more defined structures in order to increase confidence in the British 
constitutional system in line with modern understandings of basic governmental 
principles. In this sense, the Constitutional Reform Bill is really just the latest iteration of 
a largely theoretical debate running since at least the 1970s.63
The second, more immediate and political, motivation for reform is a desire for greater 
executive and legislative flexibility as the demands for government services increase, 
particularly with the need to address the recent rise of global threats such as international 
terrorism. The way the executive and legislative authority evolves and responds to these 
pressures poses important practical and pragmatic questions as to how government 
should operate in the 21st century. However, the British judiciary and common law also 
continues to evolve in the face of these and other new challenges – for example, to 
61
 Erik Jurgens, Report to the Council of Europe, Standing Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 
on the Office of the Lord Chancellor in the Constitutional System of the United Kingdom, Doc. 9798 (28 
April 2003), at ¶34. 
62 See id.
63 See e.g.,  Louis Blom-Cooper & Gavin Gavin Drewryin, Final Appeal: A Study of the House of Lords in 
its Judicial Capacity (1972).
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address the growth of modern administrative bureaucracy created by executive and 
legislative action,  and to adapt to a world characterized by a multiplicity of different type
and sources of law and regulation. Accordingly, if the constitutional balance among the 
various functions of government in the United Kingdom that was gradually established 
over many years of incremental change is now to be radically adjusted, as with the 
Constitutional Reform Bill, the ultimate impact of the proposed reforms may not be 
entirely predictable – particularly with regard to the scope of judicial review practiced in 
the United Kingdom.64
THE PROSPECTS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER A REVISED BRITISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT
Notwithstanding the theoretical neutrality and subservience of the courts to Parliament as 
enunciated by Dicey, the British courts are increasingly prone to exercise their powers to 
interpret law in creative ways that are starting to look remarkably like what Justice 
Marshall would recognize as judicial review – especially when it is recalled that Marshall 
articulated but declined to exercise that power in Marbury. Historically, judicial review in 
the U.K. was confined to restraining the exercise of executive or administrative discretion 
in excess of the authority granted by legislation. However, even this limited form of 
review grew dramatically with the expansion of government throughout the late 20th
century, from a mere 160 cases in 1974 to more than 4,000 in the 1990s.65 Moreover, 
Parliament itself has encouraged – and sometime directed – that the courts engage in a 
broader form of review.  Lord Denning spoke of the impact of the “incoming tide” of a 
64 See WOOLF LECTURE, supra note 16, at 9.
65 Judges v. Ministers: Courts Step In where MPs Fail to Tread, The Guardian, February 24, 2003, at 21; 
Scales of Justice, The Times, March 5, 2004, at 27.
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different – European style – law following the U.K.’s joining the Common Market,66
which effectively helped the judiciary to reshape British law to meet European 
obligations in accord with the European Communities Act of 1972,67 a trend which 
presumably will only increase if and when the draft European Constitution is adopted.68
More recently, devolution of a varying degree of legislative authority to Northern Irish, 
Scottish, and Welsh regional assemblies, and perhaps even more importantly the Human 
Rights Act of 1998 (HRA),69 provide the courts with new powers not only to interpret 
legislation but to rule on its legality.70
The HRA was one of the first major constitutional reforms instituted by the Labour party 
after it returned to power following nearly twenty years of Conservative government. The 
Act purports to formally bring the European Convention on Human Rights into U.K. 
domestic law although, as Britain was a major architect of the ECHR, many of the 
Convention’s substantive provisions appear at first glance simply to be a codification of 
common law principles.71 That view prevailed in the initial years following drafting and 
signature of the Convention in 1950, and therefore there was no immediate perceived 
need to expressly incorporate the international obligations of the ECHR into British law,
although it was nevertheless cited in hundreds of domestic cases as an aid to the courts in 
66 Bulmer v. Bollinger, 2 All E.R. 1226, 1231 (C.A. 1974) (opinion of
Lord Denning). 
67
 European Communities Act 1972, 1972 Chapter 68, §2, 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1972/20068--b.htm#2.
68 See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 18 July 2003, http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf; and Europa, Future of the European Union  web page 
available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm.
69
 Human Rights Act 1998, 1998, Chapter 42, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980042.htm.
70 Id. at §4, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#4.
71
 See,  Lord Donaldson’s comment that “you have to look long and hard before you can detect any 
difference between the English common law and the principles set out in the Convention, at least if the 
Convention is viewed through English judicial eyes” in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex Parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696 at 717.
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interpreting domestic law.72 However, following the British acceptance of an individual 
right of petition to Strasbourg in 1966, the U.K. lost more than fifty cases – particularly 
with regard to measures it took to address terrorism in Ireland.73 The fact that European 
judges were interpreting and applying the Convention in ways that differed from what 
British judges might do – and declaring Parliament’s legislation illegal – greatly added to 
the pressure to “bring the Convention home” and to authorize domestic courts to apply 
the ECHR directly.74
Previous attempts to do so had floundered in the face of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, and the question of how to entrench fundamental rights against their repeal 
or derogation by the actions of a subsequent, sovereign, Parliament.75 The HRA 
essentially ignores the entrenchment issue, and was passed as an ordinary piece of 
legislation. It simply relies upon a responsible government and legislature to respect the 
intent and importance of the fundamental rights listed in the Convention and that are 
made part of domestic law by the Act. In other words, the Labour government took a 
classically pragmatic British approach to the tough conceptual legal problem posed by 
parliamentary sovereignty. Lord Irvine of Lairg, the then Lord Chancellor, did so by 
essentially ensuring that the Act was not seen as a direct assault upon Parliament’s 
traditional sovereign role. 
72 See e.g. S. Grosz, J. Beatson, & P. Duffy, Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention 
(2000); M. Beloff & H. Mountfield, Unconventional Behaviour – Judicial Uses of the European 
Convention in England and Wales, [1996] EHRLR 467.
73 Les P. Carnegie, Privacy And The Press: The Impact Of Incorporating The European Convention On 
Human Rights In The United Kingdom, 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 311, 329 (1998).
74 See, Jack Straw, Home Secretary, The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/ukcor3.htm#Straw.
75 See generally,  Fitzgerald, supra note 41.
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The HRA directs that courts and other tribunals are to take the Convention rights and 
related European decisions into account when rendering their judgments,76 but they are
also directed to construe legislative and public acts as compatible with the ECHR 
whenever feasible.77 Only in the rare instances when that is clearly not possible, may the
court make a “declaration of incompatibility”78 and award other appropriate relief, 
including compensation.79 Significantly, however, the declaration does not affect the
validity, continuing operation, or enforcement of the offending measure.80 The 
government or Parliament, rather than the courts, must decide whether or not to act to 
resolve the issue with a remedial order.81 Additional provisions in the HRA preserved the 
U.K.’s preexisting derogations to the ECHR relating to the Prevention of Terrorism Acts 
and Orders, and the Education Acts, and the ability to modify these or take similar 
actions in the future82 – which subsequently became necessary with the Terrorism Act of
200083 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act of 2001.84
76
 Human Rights Act 1998, 1998, Chapter 42, §2, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#2.
77 Id. at §3, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#3; §6, 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#6.
78 Id. at §4, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#4.
79 Id. at §8, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#8.
80 Id. at §4(6), http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#4.
81 Id. at §10, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#4; and Schedule 2, 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--g.htm#sch2.
82 Id. at §§14-17, http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--b.htm#14; and Schedule 3, 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--h.htm#sch3.
83 See, Terrorism Act 2000, 2000 Chapter 11,
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000011.htm; and The Human Rights Act 
(Amendment) Order 2001, Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 1216, 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20011216.htm.
84 See, Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001, 2001 Chapter 24, 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm; The Human Rights Act 1998 
(Designated Derogation) Order 2001,  Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 3644, 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20013644.htm; and The Human Rights Act 1998 
(Amendment No. 2) Order 2001,  Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 4032, 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20014032.htm.
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Thus, the HRA affirmatively directs the courts to apply the ECHR and related European 
law, while at the same time attempting to preserve Parliament’s preeminent role in the 
British constitutional system. When the executive makes a bad decision, it is sent back to 
the government for review; similarly when Parliament passes a bad law, Parliament must 
decide what to do. Nevertheless, some commentators suggest that in reality the Act, by 
making government and public bodies more accountable, “represents an unprecedented 
transfer of political power from the executive and legislature to the judiciary, and a 
fundamental restructuring of  [Britain’s] political constitution.” 85 The result, in a classic 
illustration of the law of unintended consequences, was a dramatic increase in tension 
between the Blair government, that made passage of the HRA a major part of its party 
manifesto during the 1997 election, and the judiciary. 
The always tense relationship between the judiciary and the Home Office, a government 
ministry with responsibilities roughly akin to the Department of Homeland Security and 
the Department of Justice in the U.S.,86 became particularly contentious in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks. The Ministry’s attempts to curtail the use of juries in criminal cases,87
permit the Home Secretary to impose harsher minimum sentences than recommended by 
the courts in certain cases,88 limit the rights of immigrants or asylum seekers,89 and 
85
 K. D. Ewing, Human Rights Act And Parliamentary Democracy, (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 79,  at 
92.
86 See, Home Office, Statement of Purposes and Aims, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/inside/aims/index.html.
87 See e.g. Jean Eaglesham & Bob Sherwood, Blunkett Takes A New Tack On Multiple Offences, Financial 
Times, November 22, 2003, National News at 2; Ben Russell, Blunkett Saves Flagship Legislation With 
Climbdown On Trial By Jury, The Independent (London), November 21, 2003, News at 12.
88 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Anderson (FC) [2002] UKHL 46, [2003] 
1 AC 837.
89
 Regina (Q) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. Regina (D) v Same. Regina (J) v Same. Regina 
(M) v Same. Regina (F) v Same. Regina (B) v Same Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
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provide for the indefinite detention without trial of suspected foreign national terrorists ,90
were all rebuffed by the courts or the House of Lords. 
The Home Secretary, David Blunkett, is reportedly incensed and “fed up with having to 
deal with a situation where Parliament debates issues and the judges overturn them”.91
While acknowledging the “right of judges to challenge [the government] when we step 
outside what parliament lays down,” Blunkett says, “what [he doesn’t] “understand is the 
assertion…that somehow there is the right of judges to be engaged in perpetually 
checking and overturning processes [of] a democratically elected parliament…The judges 
are saying that they want to remain in the political debate. They are opposed to us 
removing them from the House of Lords.”92 Moreover, Blunket believes, "[t]hey want a 
supreme court which has the right to overturn the will of Parliament."93 Known as a plain 
spoken and populist Home Secretary, Blunket also demonstrated his frustration with the 
judiciary when he asked, “[t]he question is do we have a democracy where parliament 
makes the decisions and if it gets them wrong overturns them? …Or do we have a 
democracy where we say ‘You can go so far, but the real democracy is in the judiciary’ 
[2003] EWCA Civ 364, [2004] QB 36.
90 See Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001, 2001 Chapter 24, §§21-23, 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/10024--e.htm#21; Privy Council Review Committee, 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001:Report, 18 December 2003, http://www.atcsact-
review.org.uk/lib/documents/18_12_2003/Report.pdf; and M v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
Court Of Appeal (Civil Division) [2004] EWCA CIV 324, [2004] All ER (D) 367 (Mar), (Approved 
judgment).
91 Scales of Justice, The Times, March 5, 2004, at 27.
92
 Roy Hattersley, The News Interview, The Observer, March 7, 2004, News at 27.
93 Id.
23
and they should not only want to sit in parliament…they should also be able to override 
parliament?”94
Some commentators suggest that Blunkett’s exasperation with an increasingly 
independent  judiciary unafraid to use their powers under the HRA was responsible, in 
part, for the Blair government’s seemingly precipitous attempt to abolish  the Lord 
Chancellor’s Office and the announcement of the related reform proposals in June, 
2003.95 Lord Hattersley, a Labour party politician from 1958 to 1997 who served in many 
posts including that of Shadow Home Secretary,96 wrote that “[n]o Home Secretary in 
living memory…has a worse record for attempting to interfere with the judicial process. 
Arrogance has combined with populism to make Blunkett attack every judgment with 
which he disagrees.”97 Accordingly, as a defender of the judiciary and the HRA, Lord 
Irvine’s retort to the Home Secretary’s being “fed up” with judges – made shortly before 
the issuance of the press release announcing the government’s constitutional reforms –
that “maturity requires that when you get a decision that favours you, you do not clap
[a]nd when you get one that goes against you, you don’t boo,” probably did not help his 
position in the rough and tumble of British politics, and arguably contributed to the move 
to abolish the office of Lord Chancellor.98
94
 Martin Kettle, Why Labour’s Visceral Hatred of the Judges Persists,” The Guardian (London), March 9, 
2004, at 24.
95
 Jon Ungoed-Thomas & David Leppard, Contempt of Court: Is Tony Taking the Law into His Own Hands 
as Ministers Rewrite the Constitution?, The Sunday Times, June 15, 2003, News at 12.
96 See Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Roy Hattersley, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roy_Hattersley.
97
 Roy Hattersley,  Arrogance and Populism: Its Constitutional Changes are Fine, but the Government has 
a Slapdash Approach to Justice, The Guardian (London), June 23, 2003, at 16.
98
 David Pannick,  Asylum: An Abuse of Power that Would Embarrass Even Mugabe, The Times, February 
24, 2004, Law at 4.
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The desire for more unfettered governmental authority, combined with a greater need to 
protect one’s borders from foreign threats, also led to the inclusion of a specific judicial 
ouster clause in the government’s Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, 
etc.) Bill.99  Introduced at about the same time as the Constitutional Reform Bill, the 
Asylum Bill brought the clash with the judiciary and the House of Lords to a head. The 
Asylum Bill amends the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002100 to create a 
new unified system of administrative tribunals to handle appeals. Simultaneously, 
however, it precludes any further appeal from these administrative tribunals to the 
courts,101 even though the 2002 Act instituted an expedited judicial review process 
designed to reduce the problem of excessive or abusive appeals that occurred under prior 
law.102 This prompted one MP commenting on the new Asylum Bill to quip that "[i]t is 
indeed a novel principle of dealing with an abuse of process by removing the process 
rather than the abuse."103
The Asylum Bill broadly declares that “[n]o court shall have any supervisory or other 
jurisdiction (whether statutory or inherent) in relation to the Tribunal,” along with 
extensive additional provisions specifically aimed at limiting judicial review under both 
99
 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Bill (Bill 36), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/036/04036.i-iv.html.
100
 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002, 2002 Chapter 41, 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020041.htm.
101
 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Bill (Bill 36), §14, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/036/2004036.pdf.
102 WOOLF LECTURE, supra note 16, at 11. Appeals under he 2002 Act are eliminated by §14(5) of the 
Asylum Bill.  
103
 David Heath, MP, House of Commons Standing Committee B, Hearings on Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Bill, 20 January 2004, at Col. 257, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200304/cmstand/b/st040120/pm/40120s01.htm.
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existing caselaw and under the HRA.104 As such, this provision embodies the essence of 
the Home Secretary’s concerns over the judicial role, and became the focal point of the 
104 See, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Bill (Bill 36), §14(7), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/036/2004036.pdf, which reads:
(7)    After section 108 of that Act (proceedings in private) insert—
“108A  Exclusivity and finality of Tribunal’s jurisdiction
(1)  No court shall have any supervisory or other jurisdiction (whether statutory or 
inherent) in relation to the Tribunal.
(2)  No court may entertain proceedings for questioning (whether by way of appeal or 
otherwise)—
(a)  any determination, decision or other action of the Tribunal (including a 
decision about jurisdiction…),
(b)   any action of the President or a Deputy President of the Tribunal that relates 
to one or more specified cases,
(c)   any decision in respect of which a person has or had a right of appeal to the 
Tribunal…. 
(d)   any matter which the Tribunal—
(i)   was obliged to determine in accordance…this Act, or
(ii)   would have been obliged to determine in accordance with that 
section had a right of appeal mentioned in paragraph (c) been 
exercised, or
(e)   a decision to remove a person from the United Kingdom or to deport a 
person, if—
(i)   the removal or deportation is in consequence of an immigration 
decision, and 
(ii)  the person was notified, in accordance with regulations…, of a 
right to appeal [to the Tribunal] against the immigration decision 
(whether or not he exercised the right).
(3)   Subsections (1) and (2)—
(a)   prevent a court, in particular, from entertaining proceedings to determine 
whether a purported determination, decision or action of the Tribunal was a 
nullity by reason of—
(i)   lack of jurisdiction,
(ii)   irregularity, 
(iii)  error of law,
(iv)  breach of natural justice, or
(v)   any other matter, but
(b)   do not prevent a court from—
(i)   reviewing a decision to issue a certificate under section 94 or 96 of 
this Act or under Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (removal to safe country),
(ii)   entertaining proceedings to determine whether the Tribunal has 
acted in a way which is incompatible with a person’s rights under 
Article 5 of the Human Rights   
Convention (liberty and security), or
(iii)   considering whether a member of the Tribunal has acted in bad 
faith.
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judiciary’s and House of Lord’s efforts to preserve the application of the rule of law to 
government.105
Judicial ouster clauses are, of course, not new.106 Nor are British judges reluctant to use 
their interpretative powers to mitigate or eliminate the impact of such clauses whenever 
possible.107 What is significant in this Bill, however, is the breadth and extent of the 
ouster. By drafting an exceptionally comprehensive ouster provision, the fundamental 
issue of whether the judiciary would continue to accept the classic formulation of the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, or possibly act to overrule Parliament’s attempt to 
deny access to the courts as a violation of the rule of law, was squarely presented.
(4)   A court may consider whether a member of the Tribunal has acted in bad faith, in 
reliance on subsection (3)(b)(iii), only if satisfied that significant evidence has been 
adduced of—
(a)   dishonesty,
(b)   corruption, or
(c)   bias.
(5)    Section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (claim that public authority has 
infringed Convention right) is subject to subsections (1) to (3) above.
(6)   Nothing in this section shall prevent an appeal under section 2, 2B or 7 of the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) (appeals to and from 
Commission).
(7)   In this section “action” includes failure to act.”
105
 It should also be noted, however, that prior to passage of the Bill by the House of Commons, the 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs stated it believed that the judicial ouster provision in the Asylum Bill 
was “without precedent” and that “as a matter of constitutional principle some form of higher judicial 
oversight of lower Tribunals and executive decisions should be retained. This is particularly true when life 
and liberty may be at stake.” House of Commons, Constitutional Affairs Committee, ASYLUM AND 
IMMIGRATION APPEALS, SECOND REPORT OF SESSION 2003-2004 (24 February 2004), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmconst/211/211.pdf, at ¶70.
106 See id. at ¶66. 
107 Id. at ¶66-67. See also e.g., R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fayed [1997] 1 
All ER 228, [1998] 1 WLR 763.
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As  a result of the continuing evolution of the common law, as well as being encouraged 
to be more active by Parliament’s own legislation, the courts in recent years increasingly 
recognized that certain fundamental rights have constitutional import within the British 
system.108 Were Parliament to unambiguously contravene those rights, courts might 
conceivably refuse to enforce such a law notwithstanding the traditional strictures of 
parliamentary sovereignty. As Lord Chief Justice Woolf stated in his 1994 F.A. Mann 
Lecture, this is simply:
…a proper recognition of … the equal responsibility that Parliament and the 
courts are under to respect the other’s burden’s and play the proper role in 
upholding the rule of law. I see the courts and Parliament as being partners both 
engaged in a common enterprise…
There are however situations where…in upholding the rule of law, the courts have 
had to take a stand. The example which springs to mind is the Anisminic case. 109
In that case even the statement in an Act of Parliament that the [Foreign 
Compensation] Commission’s decision “shall not be called in question in any 
court of law” did not succeed in excluding the jurisdiction of the court [to 
examine whether the Commission was properly acting within the scope of 
authority granted to it by Parliament]. Since that case Parliament has not again 
mounted such a challenge to the reviewing power of the High Court. There has 
been, and I am confident, there will continue to be, mutual respect for each 
other’s roles
However, if Parliament did the unthinkable, then I would say that the courts 
would also be required to act in a manner which would be without precedent. 
Some judges might choose to do so by saying that it was an unrebuttable 
presumption that Parliament could never intend such a result. I would myself 
consider that there were advantages in making it clear that ultimately there are 
even limits on the supremacy of Parliament which it is the courts’ inalienable 
responsibility to identify and uphold. They are limits of the most modest 
dimensions which I believe any democrat would accept. They are no more than 
are necessary to enable the rule of law to be preserved.110
108 See e.g.  Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151; R v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Lightfoot
[2000] QB 597; R v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998] QB 575; R v. Home Secretary, ex parte 
Pierson [1998] AC 539; R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech [1994] QB 198.
109 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 1 All ER 208.
110
 Woolf, Droit Public – English Style, [1995] PUBLIC LAW 57, 68-69.
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Notwithstanding the confidence Lord Woolf expressed in political restraint and 
responsible government, the “unthinkable” was  under consideration in the government’s 
Asylum Bill.
Since the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty matured not a single provision of primary 
parliamentary legislation has been set aside by a British court, apart from cases where 
Parliament effectively directed the courts to do so as in the European Communities Act or 
the HRA.111 However,  continued judicial deference to legislation also depends, as Lord 
Woolf suggested in his lecture, upon Parliament observing the “principle of legality” and 
upholding the rule of law. Lord Hoffmann pursued a similar theme in the House of Lords 
decision in the Simms case where he stated that:
[p]arliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate 
contrary to fundamental principles of human rights.…The constraints upon its 
exercise by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of 
legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept 
the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or 
ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full 
implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the 
democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication 
to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words 
were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the 
courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of 
Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which 
exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a 
constitutional document.112
Thus, while parliamentary sovereignty remains the key distinguishing feature of Britain’s  
unwritten constitution, observance of the “rule of law” is itself recognized as a 
fundamental constitutional principle derived from the common law and comprising part 
111 R  v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Southall [2003] 3 C.M.L.R. 18 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1002 at ¶10.
112 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] A.C. 115, at 131.
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of the background against which parliamentary legislation may be measured. This latent 
ability to engage in an examination of whether the other arms of government have abused 
their power, which is broader than simply ensuring that Parliament’s legislative intent is 
properly implemented, is inextricably intertwined with judicial enforcement of the rule of 
law. Whether motivated by irrefutable presumptions against infringing fundamental 
rights, or limited by the principle of legality, as Professor Geoffrey  Wilson stated:
[n]obody should be surprised if in a real case of legislative enormity the courts did 
not discover a higher principle of law by which they felt free or even obliged to 
ignore the current version of the doctrine [of parliamentary sovereignty] not only 
in the name of constitutional convention but also in the name of law.113
There is nothing in Britain’s unwritten constitutional settlement that mandates that the 
courts continue to defer in all instances to the will of the government as expressed in 
Parliament. Judicial deference, like the broader "American style" power of judicial 
review, is the product of caselaw, history, and the judiciary's own conception of the 
proper role of the courts. Just as the executive and legislative functions of government 
continue to evolve in the face of new challenges and circumstances, so do the courts and 
the common law – whether as a result of gradual processes or of a conscious and radical 
transformation. Indeed, “the genius of the common law” is said to be “its capacity to 
develop,”114 and in “the developing field of judicial review, it is usually unwise to say 
‘never’.”115
In recent years several judges at different levels, while continuing to give all due 
deference to Parliament, also articulated a basic belief that the judicial role in the British 
113
 Michael Patrick Nolan, THE MAKING AND REMAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1997) at 116.
114 Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2001] UKHL 29 [2002] AC 122, at ¶33.
115 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Fayed [1992] BCLC 938, [1992] BCC 524 at 536.
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constitutional system needs to be respected.116 Although a broader notion of judicial
review is – as the Blair government notes – inherently undemocratic, it is also 
fundamental to protecting society from an "elected dictatorship".117 As Lord Bridge 
stated in the Morgan-Grampian case:  
The maintenance of the rule of law is in every way as important in a free society 
as the democratic franchise. In our society the rule of law rests upon twin 
foundations: the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament in making the law and 
the sovereignty of the Queen’s courts in interpreting and applying the law.118
Lord Lester similarly noted that Parliament cannot be regarded as having an unchallenged 
authority  to "alter or destroy the essential features of the basic structure of the 
constitution," and that if it attempts to do so the "courts will be available to decide these 
graves issues for the first time for almost three centuries,"119  applying common law 
principles to the British constitution in a manner already seen in Commonwealth cases
and in decisions appealed to the Privy Council.120 Lord Chief Justice Woolf went so far 
as to say:
I am not over-dramatising the position if I indicate that, if this [ouster] clause 
were to become law, it would be so inconsistent with the spirit of mutual respect 
116 See e.g. In Re F (Adult: Court's Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38 where J. Sedley said:
Since the conflict and settlement of the 17th century the courts have recognised the ultimate 
legislative authority of Parliament, and Parliament in its turn has respected the authority of the 
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between the different arms of government that it could be the catalyst for a 
campaign for a written constitution. Immigration and asylum involve basic human 
rights….The response of the government and the House of Lords to the chorus of 
criticism of [the ouster clause] will produce the answer to the question of whether 
our freedoms can be left in their hands under an unwritten constitution.121
Faced with an increasingly vociferous opposition from its most senior judges, as well as 
many others,  and the likelihood that the judiciary might employ what the Liberal 
Democrat and Shadow Lord Chancellor, Lord Goodhart, called the "nuclear option" of 
refusing to enforce Parliament's legislation,122 the government ultimately backed down.
Lord Falconer announced at the second reading of the Asylum Bill that the government 
was withdrawing the ouster clause, and would work with the House of Lords to provide 
for some sort of appeal mechanism to the courts in a revised version of the Asylum 
Bill.123
This, however, is the background against which the Constitutional Reform Bill will be 
considered, and the role of the proposed supreme court relative to the other arms of 
government decided. The working assumption reflected in the Constitutional Reform Bill 
is that the new supreme court, initially comprised of  the existing Law Lords, will 
essentially pick-up the judicial functions currently exercised by the House of Lords, 
unchanged.124 Indeed, the portion of the Constitutional Reform Bill addressing the actual 
operation of the proposed supreme court – as opposed to its selection, appointment, 
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composition, and benefits – consists of but a single clause and schedule that simply 
substitutes the new court for any references to the Appellate Committee or the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in prior legislation.125 However, if the traditional 
doctrine of  parliamentary sovereignty applies, as a consequence of these reforms the new 
court and its justices will be separated from, but effectively subordinate to, Parliament. In 
Lord Chief Justice Woolf's words:
[a]mong Supreme Courts of the world, our [new] Supreme Court will, because of 
its more limited role, be a poor relation. We will be exchanging a first class Final 
Court of Appeal for a second class Supreme Court.126
The proposed legislation assumes that the status quo ante regarding the judicial role in 
the British constitutional system will be maintained – but there is nothing in the Bill that 
necessarily mandates that either the new supreme court or that the lower courts must 
continue to view themselves as subservient to the will of Parliament. That view depends 
upon a constitutional practice or convention, rather than a legal requirement, and is 
ultimately enforced only by judicial acquiescence and adherence to precedent. As Lord 
Woolf's comments imply, establishing a new supreme court as part of a set of reforms 
aimed at providing greater separation among the executive, legislative, and judicial 
functions of government makes the move towards claiming an enhanced power of 
judicial review almost inevitable over time. Although this is not what Lord Woolf was 
advocating, the alternative is for the courts to accept second class status in a new British 
constitutional settlement, because the political balance among the various arms of 
government will be radically realigned with these reforms.
125 See, Constitutional Reform Bill (H.L. 30), Part 2 cl.31 and Schedule 8, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/030/2004030.pdf.
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Were the Constitutional Reform Bill to be amended to try to legislatively prevent the 
courts from modifying their traditional approach to their role or the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, it would pose an issue similar to that raised by the Asylum 
Bill. To the degree that a statement endorsing parliamentary sovereignty in the legislation 
was regarded as reflecting current norms and merely precatory, it would probably be
regarded as much less egregious than the ouster clause, and largely unobjectionable.  To 
the degree that such a provision attempted to legally limit the courts' ability to develop or 
enforce emerging common law notions of fundamental rights and freedoms, it comes 
much closer to raising the problems associated with the Asylum Bill's ouster provision. In 
either case, including such a provision in the Constitutional Reform Bill would also raise 
many of the same difficult issues regarding entrenching one sovereign Parliament's acts 
from modification or repeal by a subsequent sovereign Parliament that delayed the 
various proposals to incorporate the ECHR into domestic British law for so many years.
Passage of the HRA as ordinary legislation suggests that entrenchment is an irresoluble 
legal problem, or at least irresoluble so long as the courts adhere to the traditional view of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, were Parliament to attempt to legally prevent the courts 
from taking a more expansive view of judicial review in an amended version of the Bill, 
that attempt would fail if the judiciary were itself to decide that the broader reasons for 
supporting their conventional acquiescence to parliamentary sovereignty – the 
cooperation among the various arms of government to support the rule of law – no longer 
applied.  
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Lord Woolf also voiced additional practical political concerns over the courts' role in the 
revised constitutional structure created as a result of  the abolition of the Lord 
Chancellor's Office. The Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, who the 
government has stated in future years is likely to be a non-lawyer member of the House 
of Commons, can reasonably be expected to face extraordinary demands from the Home 
Office concerning its needs to address compelling criminal justice issues as well as the
ongoing war on terrorism, and Lord Woolf points to the Asylum Bill as an example of the 
types of issues that might arise. His concern is that the Secretary of State might be less 
well placed to protect the independence and interests of the judiciary and the unified 
court system than was the Lord Chancellor under the old structure, and that the Home 
Office might come to "dictate the agenda for the courts."127 If that indeed becomes the 
case, it simultaneously provides both an example of the unintended political 
consequences that might flow from these reforms, and a possible additional justification 
for the judiciary to reassess its own role in the process in appropriate circumstances.
Accordingly, while many questions remain unanswered over the proposed supreme 
court's jurisdiction – particularly with regard to whether giving the new court the ability 
to hear appeals from Scotland is compatible with the 1707 Treaty of Union that created 
the United Kingdom128 – it is unlikely that there will be any attempt to entrench or 
mandate adherence to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as enunciated by 
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Dicey.129 However, rearranging traditional British constitutional practices and 
conventions as proposed in the Constitutional Reform Bill, combined with the ongoing 
evolution of the common law and the judiciary's own view of their proper role, might
well prompt the development over time of a more activist approach to deciding 
constitutional issues by the new supreme court and perhaps the lower courts. 
CONCLUSION
Despite the means of the announcement, and the need for greater detail, the basic reforms 
proposed by the Blair government in the Constitutional Reform Bill make sense. 
Separating the judiciary from the executive and legislative arms of government has come 
to be recognized as a basic principle to help ensure the safe distribution of power in 
modern democracies. Accomplishing these reforms will remove a latent threat to the 
independence of the judiciary, increase confidence in British institutions across the globe, 
and bring the United Kingdom more into line with the current understanding of many of 
its international obligations. Moreover, it will do so at a crucial time, when there is 
unprecedented pressure to respond to new global threats in ways that might otherwise 
impinge upon the basic freedoms which fundamentally characterize and distinguish 
democratic governments – irrespective of whether those governments are based upon 
written or unwritten constitutions.
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Even though Lord Woolf delayed his retirement to lead the attack on many aspects of the 
government's proposals, 130 he publicly recognized that the reforms will and should go 
through in some fashion; that the Lord Chancellor's position is no longer tenable in 
modern times; that the judicial selection process needs fundamental reform; that the
independence of the judiciary needs statutory protection; and that too much currently 
rests upon a foundation of "insecure conventions and understandings".131 The Queen 
included these reforms in her annual opening speech to Parliament,132 and the 
government is committed to passage of the Constitutional Reform Bill prior to the 2005 
general election.133 Given the government's commitments, and the recognition of the need 
for change even among the critics of the proposals, even though important details remain 
unresolved – such as the costs associated with the court134 – the Constitutional reform 
Bill will pass in some form. The ancient office of Lord Chancellor will be abolished or 
radically transformed, and there will be a new Supreme Court for the United Kingdom.
Of all its various reforms put forth by this government, including the HRA, devolution, 
and reform of House of Lords, the Constitutional Reform Bill represents the single most 
fundamental and radical change in the British constitutional settlement in over three 
hundred years. While not its primary object, the Bill will necessarily prompt a wider 
debate on the question of whether Parliament or the British judiciary should decide 
whether any given law passes constitutional muster. Judicial deference and unquestioned 
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acceptance of parliamentary sovereignty is a product of the old constitutional settlement 
in the United Kingdom. Given the conscious changes being pursued by the current 
government in the name of modernization, the historical conventions, rationale, and 
political balancing that made those doctrines suitable may no longer apply with the same 
force. Accordingly, the result might well be a judiciary that is much more prone to 
engage in the broader style of judicial review that parliamentary sovereignty effectively 
curtailed. All that is needed is for a judge to decide, as John Marshall did when presented 
with an appropriate case, that it is ultimately the rule of law that is the paramount 
principle underlying the restructured British constitutional settlement – something which 
the judiciary in Great Britain appears to be increasingly willing to contemplate.
